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Auditor Independence: Its Historical Development 
And some Proposals for Research 
R. Glen Berryman 
University of Minnesota 
A 1950 publication of the A I C P A , written primarily for readers of audit 
reports, stated "Independence, both historically and philosophically, is the founda-
tion of the public accounting profession." 1 More recently the same idea has 
been restated as follows: "Independence has always been a concept fundamental 
to the accounting profession, the cornerstone of its philosophical structure." 2 
Auditors and the users of audit reports then and now would strongly support 
the above assertion. Independence has been a developing concept, as evidenced 
by shifts in position as to what constitutes an independent status for the auditor. 
For example, "strong" rules on independence have been adopted only recently. 
The sections that follow review the historical development of auditor inde-
pendence and note the need for the presence of its various aspects i n connection 
with the attest function. Specific proposals for research are developed, with 
emphasis being placed on user perceptions of independence. 
English Backgrounds 
A n early concern for independence is noted in the English Companies 
Clauses Consolidation Act of 1845, Section 102, which stated: 
Where no other Qualification shall be prescribed by the special Act , 
every Auditor shall have at least One Share i n the undertaking; and 
he shall not hold any Office i n the Company, nor be in any other 
Manner interested i n its Concerns, except as a Shareholder. 
The requirement of shareholding, however, has not been retained i n Britain as 
an auditor qualification as evidenced by the Companies Act of 1862, which per-
mitted but did not require shareholding, and by subsequent Companies Acts. 
The provision against auditors serving as officers or employees of their auditees 
appears to have been maintained continually i n the British system. The English 
Companies Act of 1948 in Section 161 provided that no person who is " . . . an 
officer or servant of the company"; or is " . . . a partner of or i n the employment 
of an officer or servant of the company"; is qualified for appointment as auditor 
of such company. 
The relationship of the auditors to the shareholders was established i n the 
same 1845 English statute noted above. A t the first meeting of a company after 
passage of that 1845 statute, the auditors would be elected by the shareholders. 
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Further, Section 118 of that Act directed that the shareholders be provided with 
the report of the auditors. The Companies Act of 1900, Section 21, provided 
that i f an auditor was not appointed at the annual general meeting of the com-
pany, the Board of Trade would, on written application of any member of the 
company, appoint the auditor for the year and fix his remuneration. The Com-
panies Act of 1929, Section 134, provided that the auditors were entitled to 
attend any general meeting of the company at which any accounts that they 
had examined or had reported on were to be presented and, further, that they 
were entitled to make any statement or explanations which they wished to make. 
Continued concern with auditor independence is evidenced by the Companies 
Act of 1948. Section 160 of that Act provided that a special annual meeting 
notice would be required for either the appointment of an auditor other than a 
retiring auditor or nonappointment of the retiring auditor. 
Developments i n the U.S . to 1940 
In the United States, independent status for the auditor appears to have 
emerged slowly as a major concern. O f course, the profession itself d id not 
grow to major size and influence unti l much later than i n Great Britain. The 
American Association of Public Accountants, established i n 1887, d id not, i n its 
early years, formally recognize the need for independence in its constitution 
or bylaws. A n amendment to the bylaws adopted i n 1907 did recognize the 
desirability of avoiding incompatible or inconsistent occupations. Recognition 
of the importance of independence is noted by the following comment of an 
early practitioner: 
The position of the public accountant in respect to corporations and 
their management is always an independent one. Unl ike the attorney, 
he is not expected to make out a case. The character of the service he 
renders is impersonal. 3 
The American Institute of Accountants, formed in 1916, and its predecessor 
organization did not appear to have been actively concerned with independence 
unti l about 1930. A 1928 editorial i n The Journal of Accountancy demonstrated 
interest i n identifying improper relationships between auditors and their clients. 
The editor pointed out that an auditor should not be involved as a stockholder, 
bondholder, officer, or director of the organization he was serving as auditor. 
H e did recognize one exception, namely, a company could appoint an auditor 
as a director when it was being reorganized. The editor stated: 
The accountant should be so utterly divorced from financial or other 
participation i n the success or failure of an undertaking under audit 
that no one could ever point an accusing finger, however unjustly, and 
allege the possibility of bias.4 
A t the 1931 annual meeting of the American Institute of Certified Public 
Accountants, a proposal was introduced as follows: 
R E S O L V E D , that the maintenance of a dual relationship, as director or 
officer of a corporation, while acting as auditor of that corporation is 
against the best interests of the public and the profession and tends to 
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destroy that independence of action considered essential in the relation-
ship between client and auditor. 5 
This resolution was referred to the Committee on Professional Ethics, but was 
not acted upon by the Institute that year. 
The following year the Congress of the United States exhibited substantial 
interest i n financial representations supported by an independent review. The 
Federal Securities Act of 1933, Section 77aa, required that certain financial in-
formation filed with the Government be certified by an independent certified 
accountant or public accountant. The Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Section 
78(1), stated that balance sheets and income statements were to be certified by 
independent public accountants i f such is required by the rules and regulations 
of the Securities and Exchange Commission. These are the first formal require-
ments mandating auditor independence. 
The Securities and Exchange Commission, under authority granted it by 
the 1933 Act , adopted the following rule on July 6, 1933: 
The Commission w i l l not recognize any such certified accountant or 
public accountant as independent i f such accountant is not i n fact inde-
pendent. Unless the Commission otherwise directs, such accountant 
w i l l not be considered independent with respect to any person in whom 
he has any interest, directly or indirectly, or with whom he is con-
nected as an officer, agent, employee, promoter, underwriter, trustee, 
partner, director, or person performing similar function. 6 
In 1934, the American Institute of Accountants' Council adopted and the annual 
meeting approved the following resolution: 
R E S O L V E D , that no member or associate shall certify the financial 
statements of any enterprise financed i n whole or i n part by the public 
distribution of securities i f he is himself the actual or beneficial owner 
of a substantial financial interest i n the enterprise or if he is committed 
to acquire such an interest.7 
The S E C rule prohibited any interest, direct or indirect, in any person with 
respect to whom the accountant is alleging independence, while the A I A position 
focused on "substantial financial interest," and omitted any reference to em-
ployment. 
In 1936, The Securities and Exchange Commission did amend its rule with 
respect to independence and adopted the Institute's position prohibiting any 
substantial interest.8 Shortly after this, the Securities and Exchange Commission 
i n Accounting Series Release #2, dated May 6, 1937, discussed briefly the inde-
pendence of an accountant as follows: 
In response to such requests, the Commission has taken the position 
that an accountant cannot be deemed to be independent if he is, or has 
been during the period under review, an officer or director of the regis-
trant or i f he holds an interest i n the registrant that is significant with 
respect to its total capital or his own personal fortune. 
The Release continued: 
In a recent case involving a firm of public accountants, one member 
of which owned stock in a corporation contemplating registration, the 
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Commission refused to hold that the firm could be considered inde-
pendent for the purpose of certifying the financial statements of such 
corporation and based its refusal upon the fact that the value of such 
holdings was substantial and constituted more than 1 percent of the 
partner's personal fortune. 
In the decade of the 1930's, both the Federal government and the public 
accounting profession adopted the view that auditors should be independent of 
their clients. The S E C exerted leadership i n determining what constituted inde-
pendence, as evidenced by its issuance of A S R #2. Emphasis was placed on 
financial interest and on employment by the client of the auditor i n capacities 
other than that of auditor. 
Independence: 1940-1955 
In 1940, the Institute adopted the following rule on independence as part 
of its Code of Professional Ethics: 
A member or associate shall not express his opinion on financial state-
ments of any enterprise financed i n whole or in part by public distribu-
tion of securities, if he is himself the actual or beneficial owner of a 
substantial financial interest i n the enterprise or if he is committed to 
acquire such an interest; nor shall a member or an associate express his 
opinion on financial statements which are used as a basis of credit, 
if he is himself the actual or beneficial owner of a substantial interest 
in the enterprise or if he is committed to acquire such interest, unless he 
discloses his financial interest i n his report. 9 
This adoption is noteworthy because (1) the financial independence rule first 
became part of the Code of Professional Ethics and (2) when financials are 
used for credit purposes, approval was apparently given for an auditor's holding 
of a substantial financial interest i f he disclosed such holding. 
In 1942, an amplification of the rule on financial independence was adopted— 
" . . . i f he owns or is committed to acquire a financial interest in the enterprise 
which is substantial either i n relation to its capital or to his own personal 
fortune . . . " 1 0 This action brought the Institute i n line wi th the SEC's 1937 
action i n ASR #2 as to investment, but not wi th respect to other employment 
arrangements. 
The S E C i n Accounting Series Release #22, of March 14, 1941, reported an 
opinion of its Chief Accountant, W i l l i a m W . Werntz, as follows: 
When an accountant and his client, directly or through an affiliate, have 
entered into an agreement of indemnity which seeks to assure to the 
accountant immunity from liability for his own negligent acts, whether 
of omission or commission, it is my opinion that one of the major 
stimuli to objective and unbiased consideration of the problems encoun-
tered in a particular engagement is removed or greatly weakened. Such 
condition must frequently induce a departure from the standards of 
objectivity and impartiality which the concept of independence implies. 
That same release also cited, wi th approval, the Cornucopia Gold Mines, 1 S E C 
364, (1936) decision which held that the certification of a balance sheet prepared 
by an employee of the auditor who was also serving as an unsalaried but principal 
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financial accounting officer of the registrant and who was also a shareholder 
of the registrant was not a certification by an independent accountant. 
The S E C i n Accounting Series Release #37, dated November 7, 1942, indi-
cated that i n determining independence, consideration would be given to the 
propriety of the relationships and practices involved i n all services performed 
for the company by such accountant. Accounting Series Release #47, dated 
January 25, 1944, reported several situations i n which non-independence was 
found, including the following: 
1. Both an accountant and a business associate made loans to the regis-
trant. Further, a son of the accountant was an officer of the regis-
trant. 
2. The accountant advanced funds to the registrant for financing a 
new department. 
3. The registrant was unable to pay the accountant's fee and the regis-
trant pledged shares of its own stock to assure that such fee would 
be paid. In addition, it had given the accountant an option to 
purchase the pledged security at market price at the option date. 
4. The accountant was the treasurer and a shareholder of a company 
which sold some of a registrant's products. 
5. The son of a partner was serving as assistant treasurer and chief 
accountant of a registrant. The son resided with his father. 
6. The accountant audited cash reports prepared by the client's staff, 
entered them i n a summary record, posted such data to the general 
ledger and made adjusting journal entries each month. 
The above list provides additional evidence that the S E C wanted to maximize 
the likelihood of an objective review by prohibiting a significant financial interest 
or a close personal relationship with the client. 
The American Institute of Accountants through its Committee on Audi t ing 
Procedure produced a special report i n 1947 entitled Tentative Statement of 
Auditing Standards; Their Generally Accepted Significance and Scope. The 
second general standard stated, " I n all matters relating to the assignment, an 
independence i n mental attitude is to be maintained by the auditor or auditors." 
Independence in fact is emphasized i n this document, as discussed on p. 17— 
Independence i n the last analysis bespeaks an honest disinterest on the 
part of the auditor i n the formulation and expression of his opinion, 
which means unbiased judgment and objective consideration of facts as 
determinants of that opinion. It implies not the attitude of a prosecutor, 
but a judicial impartiality that recognizes an obligation on his part for 
a fair presentation of facts which he owes not only to the management 
and the owners of a business (generally, in these days, the holder of 
equity securities i n a corporation) but also to the creditors of a busi-
ness, and to those who may otherwise have a right to rely ( in part, at 
least) upon the auditor's report, as i n the case of prospective owners 
or creditors. 
This position was subsequently affirmed i n the 1954 publication Generally 
Accepted Auditing Standards. 
In 1950 the S E C revised its rule on independence by deleting the word 
"substantial" from the phrase "any substantial interest." Thus, the S E C went 
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back to its 1933 position in which there was a prohibition against the accountant 
having any direct financial interest in his client. The Institute in January, 1962, 
some twelve years after the above stated S E C rule revision, moved to prohibit 
the direct financial interest or material indirect financial interest i n an enterprise 
under audit by the member. 1 1 D u r i n g the interim (1950-1962) a double standard 
as to investment in the client company prevailed—no direct financial interest for 
S E C work and no substantial direct financial interest for other engagements. 
The double standard also existed wi th respect to employment—no employment 
of the types listed i n A S R #2 was permitted for S E C work. The Institute was 
silent on the matter of other employment of the auditor by the client company. 
The concept of independence was being developed and articulated in the 
1940-1955 period. Specific rules were adopted to require independence. Though 
independence in fact was emphasized, the illustrations publicized by the S E C 
could be interpreted to suggest that the appearance of independence was a major 
factor in its evaluations of the independence of accountants. Prohibition of an 
auditor's holding of a financial interest i n a client was being established. 
Independence: 1956-1973 
The membership of the A I C P A in January 1962 adopted the following rule 
on independence as part of its Code of Professional Ethics. A R T I C L E 1: Rela-
tions with Clients and Public. 
1.01 Neither a member or associate, nor a firm of which he is a partner, 
shall express an opinion on financial statements of any enterprise unless 
he and his firm are i n fact independent with respect to such enterprise. 
Independence is not susceptible of precise definition, but is an expression 
of the professional integrity of the individual. A member or associate, 
before expressing his opinion on financial statements, has the responsi-
bility of assessing his relationships wi th an enterprise to determine 
whether, i n the circumstances, he might expect his opinion to be con-
sidered independent, objective and unbiased by one who had knowledge 
of all the facts. 
A member or associate w i l l be considered not independent, for example, 
with respect to any enterprise if he, or one of his partners, (a) during 
the period of his professional engagement or at the time of expressing 
his opinion, had, or was committed to acquire, any direct financial in-
terest or material indirect financial interest i n the enterprise, or (b) 
during the period of his professional engagement, at the time of ex-
pressing his opinion or during the period covered by the financial state-
ments, was connected wi th the enterprise as a promoter, underwriter, 
voting trustee, director, officer or key employee. In cases where a 
member or associate ceases to be the independent accountant for an 
enterprise and is subquently called upon to re-express a previously 
expressed opinion on financial statements, the phrase, "at the time of 
expressing his opinion" refers only to the time at which the member 
or associate first expressed his opinion on the financial statements i n 
question. The word "director" is not intended to apply to a connection 
in such a capacity with a charitable, religious, civic or other similar 
type of nonprofit organization when the duties performed in such a 
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capacity are such as to make it clear that the member or associate can 
express an independent opinion on the financial statements. The 
example cited i n this paragraph, of circumstances under which a mem-
ber or associate w i l l be considered not independent, is not intended to 
be all inclusive. 
This rule moved the A I C P A closer to the S E C position i n that it prohibited 
direct financial interest in the client and for the first time prohibited specific 
employment relationships, such as director or officer of a client, during the period 
of the professional engagement. Independence i n fact was emphasized i n the 
first paragraph of this rule, while independence in appearance was specified i n 
the second paragraph. 
Effective March 1, 1973, the membership of the A I C P A adopted new rules 
of conduct that included the following: 
R U L E 1 0 1 — I N D E P E N D E N C E . A member or a firm of which he is a 
partner or shareholder shall not express an opinion on financial state-
ments of an enterprise unless he and his firm are independent with 
respect to such enterprise. Independence w i l l be considered to be im-
paired if, for example: 
A . D u r i n g the period of his professional engagement, or at the time 
of expressing his opinion, he or his firm: 
1. H a d or was committed to acquire any direct or material indirect 
financial interest in the enterprise; or 
2. H a d any joint closely held business investment with the enter-
prise or any officer, director, or principal stockholder thereof which 
was material i n relation to his or his firm's net worth; or 
3. H a d any loan to or from the enterprise or any officer, director 
or principal stockholder thereof. This latter proscription does not 
apply to the following loans from a financial institution when made 
under normal lending procedures, terms and requirements: 
(a) Loans obtained by a member of his firm which are not 
material i n relation to the net worth of such borrower. 
(b) Home mortgages. 
(c) Other secured loans, except loans guaranteed by a member's 
firm which are otherwise unsecured. 
B. Dur ing the period covered by the financial statements, during the 
period of the professional engagement or at the time of expressing an 
opinion, he or his firm 
1. Was connected wi th the enterprise as a promoter, underwiter 
or voting trustee, a director or officer or i n any capacity equivalent 
to that of a member of management or of an employee; or 
2. Was a trustee of any trust or executor or administrator of any 
estate if such trust or estate had a direct or material indirect financial 
interest i n the enterprise; or was a trustee for any pension or profit 
sharing trust of the enterprise. 
The above examples are not intended to be all-inclusive. 1 2 
R U L E 1 0 2 — I N T E G R I T Y A N D O B J E C T I V I T Y . A member shall not 
knowingly misrepresent facts, and when engaged i n the practice of 
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public accounting, including the rendering of tax and management 
advisory services, shall not subordinate his judgment to others. In tax 
practice, a member may resolve doubt i n favor of his client as long as 
there is reasonable support for his position. 1 3 
The need for the appearance of independence is not stated as it was i n the 
previous Rule 1.01 (. . . he might expect his opinion to be considered inde-
pendent, objective and unbiased by one who had knowledge of all the facts.) but 
the listing of the prohibitions and the indication of specific situations which are 
acceptable strongly urges continued interest i n the appearance of independence. 
It is also interesting to note that some of the previous "Interpretations of Rules 
of Conduct of the A I C P A Division of Professional Ethics" were incorporated i n 
the new Restatement publication. Interpretation "101-3—Accounting Services" 
emphasizes independence in appearance by suggesting that the auditor consider 
whether he is " . . . lacking in independence i n the eyes of a reasonable ob-
server." 1 4 It is also noteworthy that the 1973 Restatement includes Rule 202 
which incorporates expressly generally accepted auditing standards. Those stand-
ards include the general standard requiring an "independence in mental attitude," 
which is independence in fact. 
Statement on Auditing Standards #1, dated November, 1972, issued by the 
Committee on Audit ing Procedure of the A I C P A , included i n paragraph 220.03 
the following statement. " T o be independent the auditor must be intellectually 
honest; to be recognized as independent, he must be free from any obligation 
to or interest i n the client, its management, or its owners." Thus, continued 
emphasis on independence i n fact as well as the appearance of independence is 
maintained i n this document. 
The S E C continued to push the development of rules related to independence, 
as evidenced by its issuing of Accounting Series Release #81, December 11, 1958, 
and Accounting Series Release #97, May 21, 1963. In A S R #81, 54 situations 
were reviewed, 34 of which noted the accountants as "not independent," 19 of 
which noted the accountants "have not been held to be not independent" and 
one in which accountants would be independent as to one entity and not inde-
pendent as to another entity. The S E C i n A S R #97 found that a C P A i n 
practice was not independent where he was one of three stockholders and an 
officer and co-manager of a finance company which made loans to customers and 
employees of a client who was a registered broker-dealer. 
The SEC's primary pronouncement on independence is Rule 2-01 (b) of 
Regulation S-X. That rule, enforced today, states: 
The Commission w i l l not recognize any certified public accountant or 
public accountant as independent who is not i n fact independent. For 
example, an accountant w i l l be considered not independent with respect 
to any person or any of its parents, its subsidiaries, or any other affili-
ates, (1) i n which, during the period of his professional engagement 
to examine the financial statements being reported on or at the date 
of his report, he or his firm or a member thereof had, or is committed 
to acquire, any direct financial interest or any material indirect financial 
interest; or (2) wi th which , during the period of his professional en-
gagement to examine the financial statements being reported on, at the 
date of his report or during the period being covered by the financial 
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statements, he or his f irm or a member thereof was connected as a 
promoter, underwriter, voting trustee, director, officer, or employee, 
except that a firm w i l l not be deemed not independent i n regard to a 
particular person i f a former officer or employee of such person is em-
ployed by the firm and such individual has completely disassociated 
himself from the person and its affiliates and does not participate i n 
auditing financial statements of the person or its affiliates covering any 
period of his employment by the person. For the purposes of Rule 2-01, 
the term "member" means all partners in the firm and all professional 
employees participating i n the audit or located in an office of the firm 
participating in a significant portion of the audit . 1 5 
It is interesting to note that the S E C rule does not include a distinction between 
independence i n fact and the appearance of independence. 
Accounting Series Release #123, March 23, 1972, endorsed the establishment 
of standing audit committees composed of outside directors as a means of pro-
viding "protection to investors who rely upon such financial statements." Ac-
counting Series Release #126, July 5, 1972, provided some guidelines for 
accountants for determining existence or lack thereof of independence. It stated, 
"The concept of independence, as it relates to the accountant, is fundamental to 
this purpose because it implies an objective analysis of the situation by a dis-
interested third party." Examples were provided of situations in which the 
independence of accountants could be challenged. W i t h respect to management 
service activities, the Release states . . . 
The basic consideration is whether, to a third party, the client appears 
to be totally dependent upon the accountant's skill and judgment i n its 
financial operations or to be reliant only to the extent of the customary 
type of consultation of advice. 
As to E D P and bookkeeping services, the Release states . . . 
Systems design is a proper function of the qualified public accountant. 
Computer programming is an aspect of systems design and does not con-
stitute a bookkeeping service . . . where source data is provided by 
the client and the accountant's work is limited to processing and produc-
tion of listings and reports, independence w i l l be adversely affected if the 
listings and reports become part of the basic accounting records on 
which, at least in part, the accountant would base his opinion. 
As to unpaid fees the Release indicated, 
When the fees for an audit or other professional service remain unpaid 
over an extended period of time and become material i n relation to the 
current audit fee, it may raise questions concerning the accountant's 
independence because he appears to have a financial interest i n the 
client . . . normally the fees for the prior year's audit should be paid 
prior to the commencement of the current engagement. 
As to business relationships with clients, the Release suggested that joint business 
ventures with clients, limited partnership agreements, investments i n supplier 
or customer companies, rental of blocks of computer time to a client (except in 
emergency or temporary situations) would adversely affect independence. 
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Accounting Series Release #144, of May 23, 1973, considered the inde-
pendence of a large firm of public accountants and alleged that they were not 
independent because partners or employees of accountant's branch office during 
the time when they were working on the audit of a client, received payments 
from the general partners of the client company totaling about $17,000, " i n the 
guise of profits from participation in the purchase and sale of "hot issues'." 
Dur ing the 1956-1973 period, emphasis centered on refining the rules for 
determination of the existence of independence. The S E C tended to lead the 
way i n establishing guidelines, though substantial efforts were made by the 
A I C P A to clarify the meaning of its ethics and its concept of independence. The 
appearance of independence was considered critical, though the profession and 
the S E C remained as "judges" of independence. The A I C P A adopted the S E C 
position on avoidance of any direct financial interest i n a client. 
Aspects of Independence 
The purpose of the auditor's representation as to his independence is to 
develop i n users' minds a high level of confidence i n his reports. If that con-
fidence with respect to his technical skills and his independence is not present, 
then the value of the audit report is diminished greatly. 
The concept of independence implies freedom from control and domination 
by another party. It implies impartiality and the absence of bias in the gathering 
of evidence, interpretation of evidence and opinion formulation. The auditor 
as an independent party must be wi l l ing and be i n a strong position to insist 
on that course of action which his professional judgment urges is the appropriate 
one i n the circumstances. 
Independence has a "time" component—it must exist for some min imum 
period of time for each audit situation. A n independent state of mind must exist 
from the time an audit contract comes into existence unti l the report is rend-
ered and subsequent responses interpreting such report have been given. It 
seems to be generally agreed that an independent attitude must be maintained 
from the time that an engagement is undertaken until a l l audit work, including 
reporting, is completed. 
Independence has a "party" component—the auditor must not be under 
the influence of the client or other party at interest. Aspects of this are reflected 
by the question raised by a C P A , quoted i n a Forbes article, "Since auditors are 
selected and paid by management, are they truly independent?" 1 6 This raises 
a series of issues, including: (1) W h o should select the auditor? (2) W h o should 
make the decision to change auditors? (3) W h o should pay the audit fee? and 
(4) W i t h respect to what parties should the auditor be independent? 
Independence has a "what" component. Carey has stated: 
Independence has three meanings to the certified public accountant. 
First, i n the sense of not being subordinate, it means honesty, integrity, 
objectivity and responsibility. Second, i n the narrower sense i n which 
it is used in connection with auditing and expression of opinions on 
financial statements, independence means avoidance of any relationship 
which would be likely, even subconsciously, to impair the C P A ' s ob-
jectivity as auditor. T h i r d , it means avoidance of relationships which 
to a reasonable observer would suggest a conflict of interest. 1 7 
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Mautz and Sharaf suggest, "Three phases of independence are important to 
independent auditing. First is the independence of approach and attitude . . . 
The second phase . . . freedom from bias and prejudice, . . . The third phase 
. . . to separate the two divisions (auditing and other services) of public ac-
counting . . . " 1 8 Questions could be asked such as (1) H o w important is the 
appearance of independence? (2) Can independence i n fact be measured? and 
(3) What relationships should be avoided? 
Independence has a "How shall it be maintained?" component. This raises 
questions such as (1) W h o shall judge whether it has or has not been main-
tained? (2) What procedures should be adopted to provide assurance to users 
that independence has been maintained? and (3) What operational tests shall 
be applied by reviewers to detect a lack of independence? 
Selection, Payment and Change of Auditors 
The user group for audit service now includes at least management, credi-
tors, the current shareholders, prospective shareholders, employees, and govern-
mental units. External users i n general have a strong desire for the auditor to 
take an impartial and unbiased approach to his work. 
The auditor's role can be likened to that of a judge, who listens to the 
charges or petitions, hears the arguments, evaluates the evidence presented and 
its bearing on the issues, considers the legal rules that are applicable, reasons to 
a conclusion and renders an opinion indicating his findings and their underlying 
rationale. But audit practice differs somewhat. The auditor collects his own 
evidence rather than rely on the two or more parties i n the case to each collect 
evidence and present it i n an adversary proceeding. Also, no cross examination 
is provided for i n auditing. O n the other hand, the public accountant must be 
aware of the underlying rules, must reason to a conclusion and must render 
an opinion as does the judge. 
W h o should select the auditor? The parties i n a legal action do not make 
the final determination as to what judge w i l l hear the case nor what jurors w i l l 
be called. W o u l d the user's view of auditor independence be strengthened by 
having auditors appointed by a governmental authority (e.g., an equivalent to 
the English Board of Trade)? Some companies have audit committees com-
posed of outside directors. Does this arrangement, as far as it is related to 
selection of auditors and communications with the auditors, increase perceived 
independence? 
W h o should pay the auditor? A judge receives his "fee" i n the form of 
salary from the state, whereas the auditor receives his fee from his client and 
the auditor has some control over the size of the fee. Is this arrangement on 
audit fees one that should be continued or do the users perceive this arrangement 
as one which impairs the auditor's independence? 
O n what basis should public accounting firms accept new clients? A t the 
present time, each f irm adopts its own criteria for acceptance of new engage-
ments. Consideration could be given to the question of whether independence 
with respect to any existing client would be affected adversely by the acceptance 
of a new client. 
W h e n should auditors be changed? What internal or external changes i n 
relationships might have an effect on independence? What relationships between 
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auditor and client could impact independence? For example, would the hir ing 
by the client of several audit staff members have a negative impact? W h o should 
be responsible for detecting such changes and then urging and or making a change 
i n auditor? 
A number of questions have been asked above, and no answers appear to be 
readily available. Research could well be undertaken to ascertain user and 
auditor views on each of the above, including their implications for the be-
havior of the auditor under varying sets of circumstances. 
What Constitutes Independence? 
Independence i n appearance has received attention i n the literature. It 
involves the perception of the auditor's independence by parties interested i n 
audit reports. F r o m the standpoint of the external user, every judgment made 
by the auditor has an independence aspect. Such judgments include but are not 
limited to his search for clientele, staff hir ing, assignment of staff to the engage-
ment, approach to his audit investigation, evaluation of evidence, and develop-
ment of his opinions. If any judgment appears to involve compromise, even 
though of apparent minor import, subordination may be alleged and perceived 
independence may be questioned. For example, the decision to omit a con-
firmation of a specified receivable or auditor acquiescence to the change i n the 
wording of a footnote could give rise to a feeling by a user that the auditor's 
judgment was subordinated. 
H o w can auditors be assured that users have a high level of confidence i n 
their independence? The perception of the user must certainly be taken into 
account. H o w do we measure the reader's perception of independence? Perhaps 
some measuring instrument 1 9 could be developed such that the profession as a 
whole could monitor user pulse. Deterioration of the level of perceived inde-
pendence could then be attacked by the profession i n a variety of ways, such as 
proscriptions as to activities felt by the user to be impinging on independence 
and education of the users as to the "real " state of auditor independence. Dif-
ferent users and different groups of users may have different concepts of what 
constitute independence and "how m u c h " independence is essential. The dif-
ferences or even conflicts i n view points could present difficulties as well as 
could attempts to develop recommendations for actions to raise the level of 
perceived independence. 
There has been little emphasis placed on the determination of what attri-
butes create independence i n fact. Independence i n fact seems to require absolute 
intellectual honesty and the absence of obligation to any potential user. 
Professor Barrett has indicated that " . . . the audit profession's ethical 
notion of apparent independence can be operationally defined as a sociological 
role construct, and . . . its conception of real independence can be operationally 
defined as a personality construct." 2 0 H e suggests that: 
Professional Audit Independence contains two constructs. Interpersonal 
Independence describes functional situations which promote or dys-
functional situations which impair the profession's auditor image as per-
ceived by reasonable observers . . . Intrapersonal Independence is the 
second order factor containing three operational content variables. It is 
assumed that male individuals—who are field analytical rather than 
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global field types, who evidence a low social approval need rather than 
being approval motivated and who prefer to describe themselves i n 
terms of independent rather than intermediate or dependent personality 
typologies—tend to possess a high degree of intrapersonal independence 
as characterized by their behavior i n test and non-test situations. 2 1 
Professor Barrett goes on to indicate that, i n his opinion, on the basis of ex-
ploratory studies, interpersonal and intrapersonal independence can both be 
determined by means of empirical testing. Additional research i n this area, 
largely untouched to date, seems warranted. 
What relationships should be avoided? A t a recent bank's annual meeting, 
a minority shareholder sharply criticized a $1,600,000 loan by the bank to the 
company's auditors on the ground that such was a "conflict of interest and 
jeopardized the independent status of the auditor." 2 2 Many public accounting 
firms are strongly interested i n "sell ing" management services. Might not the 
user of an audit report suspect a tradeoff between the accounting firm and its 
client on the basis that the audit might be reduced i n scope or a disclosure 
requirement changed i f the particular management service was "purchased"? 
As related earlier, the S E C has indicated i n various releases situations where 
independence is questioned N o comprehensive research appears to have been 
undertaken on this question. A substantial pay-off should be obtainable from 
a comprehensive research project covering satisfactory and unsatisfactory rela-
tionships, particularly if user views are taken into account i n the project. 
Maintenance of Independence 
What party or parties should assess the presence or absence of independence? 
T o date, the public accounting profession and the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission have been the formulators of the rules regarding independence and also 
the enforcers of such rules. The view of the S E C can be presumed to reflect 
their perception of the needs of the security investors for auditor independence. 
However, it appears that a major thrust of the S E C work and of the A I C P A 
documents is providing for the appearance of independence. If such appearance 
of independence is the prime focus, why should not al l external parties or their 
representatives have a voice i n formation and enforcement of the rules on inde-
pendence? Would not such position provide a "watch-dog" and aid greatly 
i n maintenance of confidence by users i n auditors' reports? 
In developing confidence i n the minds of the users of financials, should we 
institute a review of the audit report and its underlying documentation? In 
the judicial system a judge's opinion is appealable to successively higher levels, 
up to the Supreme Court of the U .S . W e do not have an equivalent procedure 
for appeal of an auditor opinion, nor for a subsequent investigation of it by 
another professional. Might not the adoption of a procedure for auditing the 
auditor enhance user confidence levels i n the effective independence of the 
auditor? Research into the opinion of users and auditor reactions to such a 
required review would be helpful i n anticipating the effect of such a requirement. 
Operational tests of independence must await a determination of those 
attributes which contribute to independence and those that detract from it. If 
those attributes can be determined, the profession and the users of its services, 
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or the parties designated to assess the existence of independence, can proceed to 
formulate operational tests or guides to ascertain the existence of a satisfactory 
state of independence. 
Summary 
Independence has, i n varying degrees, been a concern of auditors and the 
users of audit reports since the early days of the profession i n England and the 
United States. In the U.S., development of the concept of independence has 
been pushed by the Securities and Exchange Commission as a representative of 
one set of users. The American Institute of Certified Public Accountants has, 
through various publications, articulated concepts of independence and has 
adopted independence as a mandatory qualification for the auditor. It is sug-
gested that the need for independence is related exclusively to the attest function 
and that unless the user perceives independence to exist, the attest function has 
extremely limited value. Various relationships between (1) auditor and client 
and (2) auditor and external parties can have impacts on perceived independence 
and independence i n fact. 
Research needs to be undertaken with respect to user perceptions of inde-
pendence; the relationships which they feel impair independence as well as 
those which promote independence. Research could be undertaken on a joint 
basis by representatives of the profession and representatives of various user 
groups. This arrangement should promote soundness of research design, im-
partiality i n evidence gathering, summarization and interpretation, and accepta-
bility of the research reports. The research projects could focus on many ques-
tions, such as (1) W h o should appoint and remove the auditors? (2) What 
relationships between client and auditor are likely to impede the exercise of 
impartial, unbiased judgments? (3) W h o should pay for audit services ren-
dered? (4) Should reviews of auditor work, including audit independence, be 
undertaken? and (5) What instruments best measure independence? 
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